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Is pollution a dirty word? To answer this question we develop an endogenous growth 
model à la Rebelo (1991) where dirtiness becomes a fundamental choice variable for 
the economy to grow. Conclusions to our analysis say that a positive sustainable 
economic growth is attainable only if polluting production activities are taken into 
account. Moreover, transitional dynamics points out that local stability and uniqueness 
of equilibria are also achieved. 
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Nowadays, pollution is still considered a dirty word. The basic question is
whether or not a continued environmental degradation becomes necessary to
the process of industrialisation of an economy of our times. It is commonly
accepted in the literature of this ￿eld that a clear connection between growth
and environmental quality is so much complex, and not so easy to be found.1
In fact, although concentration in the environment of some pollutants seem
to bene￿t from growth (see, for example, coliforms in river basins); others
irremediably worsen (as for CO2, SO2); and still others do exhibit deteri-
oration at a ￿rst stage followed by clear amelioration in a second phase of
development.
Following Aghion-Howitt (1998), and Grimaud (1999), our scope is then
to introduce environmental concerns as a fundamental choice variable for an
economy to grow. To this end, the present paper is so aimed at describing how
an economy ￿ with depletion of environmental quality ￿ performs by means
of a Rebelo-type (1991) model. Why to choose this model? First, because
it guarantees endogenous growth, although the simplicity of the structure,
which is within the scope of our work. Second, because we do not need to
endogenise the technological sector which is simply maintained constant, thus
simplifying the analysis. In other words, this version of the model considers
a production function close to Rebelo￿ s (1991), and given by
y = Akz (1)
where z represents a measure of dirtiness due to the existing production
techniques (as pointed out by Aghion-Howitt, 1998), while A is a constant
which captures the level of technology. Besides, y stands for output, and k is
a measure for aggregate capital, respectively. As we do not distinguish any
kind of specialisation among workers, from now on we will be dealing only
with variables in per capita terms. Therefore, the level of new investments
in physical capital can be expressed in the usual form
_ k = y ￿ c
We also borrow from Aghion-Howitt (1998) the assumption that pollution
be a by-product of output. The ￿ ow of pollution loads P is then assumed to
1For a complete survey of the literature concerning environmental economics, sustain-
able development and endogenous growth, see Pittel (2003).
2be proportional to the level of production, and to the use of cleaner technolo-
gies (which means low values of z) that reduce the pollution/output ratio
P = Y z
￿ ￿ > 0 (2)
Following the existing literature of the ￿eld we also assume that the struc-




where c is per capita consumption, and E the usual environmental quality




as the ratio of the values of environmental quality and consumption, both
evaluated at their marginal utilities (see Le Kama-Schubert, 2004). That is,
￿(￿) re￿ ects the ￿relative preference for the environment￿of the representa-
tive agent. Therefore, the utility function we adopted so far allows us to deal
with the useful property of unitarian ￿green preferences￿ , that is ￿ = 1.
On the other hand, environmental quality is supposed to evolve according
to the law of motion
_ E = ￿E ￿ P (3)
where ￿ represents the speed at which nature regenerates, and being now
aware of the functional form assumed by the ￿ ow of pollution, when we
substitute equation (1) into (2), such that P = Y z￿ = Akz1+￿.
Finally, we focus on a centralised solution problem.3
2Both arguments c and E enter this utility function as two substitute goods. That







and consequently, ￿ > 1. Remember also that the higher ￿, the less willing are households
to accept deviations from a uniform pattern of consumption over time (see Barro-Sala-i-
Martin, 2004).
3Appendix A provides a complete solution to the maximisation problem which will be
discussed in the next section.
3Social planner analysis







subject to the following constraints on per capita physical capital, and envi-
ronmental quality:
_ k = Akz ￿ c
_ E = ￿E ￿ Akz
1+￿
and given initial conditions on the state variables
k(0) = k0 E(0) = E0








where ￿, and ￿ represent the shadow prices of physical capital, and environ-
mental quality, respectively.
First order condition for a maximum requires the discount Hamiltonian
function to be maximised with respect to its control variables (c, and z)
@HC
@c





= 0 =) ￿ = ￿(1 + ￿)z
1+￿ (5)
















￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿
4this leading to a balanced growth rate given by
g =
’(1 + ￿) ~ z￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿
2￿ ￿ 1
(7)
where ’ represents the share of consumption to environmental quality.4
A comparative static exercise might show that, depending the growth
rate, g, on the level of dirty emissions, ~ z, it follows necessarily that when ~ z
increases, g raises accordingly. Hence, polluting emissions seem necessary for




’￿ (1 + ￿) ~ z￿￿1
2￿ ￿ 1
> 0
since we assumed ￿ > 1.
Local stability and uniqueness of equilibria
Which path will this economy follow while converging to the steady state? Is
our system stable or unstable? If it is stable, do solutions describe uniqueness
or multiplicity of equilibria, or might we face indeterminacy problems? To
answer these questions, we ought to investigate the local stability properties
of the BGP found in the previous section and describe the reasons for why
an indeterminate equilibrium could possibly arise. To this end, we have to
analyse the Jacobian matrix of the reduced system, and check for the sign of
the associated eigenvalues.









4Solution to this model requires consumption and environmental quality to grow in











5and make the weak sustainability condition, that is we assume the environ-
mental quality to grow over time at a constant rate (
_ E
E = ￿);5 thus driving












































































where ￿ = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ > 0.
The Jacobian matrix, evaluated at the steady state, then becomes
J














































Proposition 1 Let assume the following parameters￿restrictions: ￿ > 1,
￿ > 1, ￿ > 0, ’ > 0, and ￿ > ￿; then the equilibrium is locally unique: J￿
has one negative eigenvalue and two eigenvalues with positive real parts.
5Remember that under the weak sustainability version, environmental quality is not
constrained to be constant over time ( _ E = 0), thanks to technological progress which
permits to substitute natural capital with phisical capital continuously.
6Since both parameters ￿ and ￿ are constrained to be greater than unity (￿ > 1, ￿ > 1).
6Proof. For completeness, see also the Appendix B.








being ￿ the auxiliary variable (the eigenvalue of the system). Provided that
trJ￿ > 0, BJ￿ < 0, and DetJ￿ < 0, we can thus check for local stability
of the system around the steady state by means of the neat Routh-Hurwitz
theorem, which can be summarised as
The number of roots of the characteristic polynomial with positive real







that we can brie￿ y synthesise for our model as
￿ + + ￿
that is, we have two changes of sign, hence J￿ has one negative eigenvalue and
two eigenvalues with positive real parts. As a consequence, the equilibrium
is locally unique.
Trying to simulate the system numerically, we can solve for it by sub-
stituting out some reasonable parameter values that can be found across
the literature on the ￿eld (See, for example, Stokey, 1998).7 Therefore, the
characteristic equation of the system now becomes
f(￿) = ￿￿
3 + 0:09￿
2 + 0:013￿ ￿ 0:0007 (9)
7With the following parameters￿scheme:
￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿
2 1:5 1 0:03 0:02









since we assume that the level of technology (A) is normalised to one, for simplicity, while




E = ￿ = 0:03
￿
. Finally, we assume a small, but still positive, level of the
social discount rate, ￿.
7which can be solved through Cardano￿ s formula, and represented as follows
ț
f(ț)
Figure 1: Characteristic Function
that is to say, there is a double change of sign, and there are one negative
eigenvalue and two complex conjugate eigenvalues with positive real part.8
With a three-dimensional phase space, motion close to an equilibrium can
be studied on the basis of local linearised equations. In our case, graphic
8Cardano￿ s formula to solve cubic equations in basic form:
x3 + ax2 + bx + c = 0
can be obtained through the convenient substitution y = x+a=3, that leads to the reduced
form:
y3 + py + q = 0
with p = 3b￿a
2
3 and q = c + 2a
3
27 ￿ ab











































8representation of the solution might be depicted as
1 negative and 2 complex
conjugate with positive real
part eigenvalues
Figure 2: Liapunov￿ s Saddle
As pointed out in the Argand diagram above the picture, we can think of
it as a so-called Liapunov￿ s ￿saddle of index 2￿ , where the index stands for the
number of positive eigenvalues. Hence, for any starting value of our state-like
variables ￿ capital (k) and environmental quality (E) ￿ the corresponding
initial values of our control-like variables ￿ consumption (c) and the level
of dirtiness (z) ￿ must be those which lay along the stable manifold that
drives the system towards the stable equilibrium point. The general idea is
that, for any positive initial level of physical and natural capital, k0 and E0,
there is a unique initial level of consumption and dirtiness, c0 and z0, that
is consistent with households￿intertemporal optimisation. Obviously, if the
economy does not start with these initial values, that is we are o⁄the stable
manifold, we will never reach the equilibrium, thus being balanced growth
amongst variables irremediably compromised.
Remarks
Although some attempts have been made to extend traditional endogenous
growth models, they mostly lead to indeterminacy, that is multiple equilib-
9ria might arise.9 Traditional explanations of indeterminacy arising in en-
dogenous growth models is explained through two identical economies with
identical initial conditions that might consume, produce new goods though
polluting the environment, and exploit natural resources at completely di⁄er-
ent rates. Only in the long run are these economies supposed to converge to
the same growth rate, but not to the same level of output, consumption, and
human and physical capital.10 Conclusions to our analysis say that we might
face determinacy instead, and transitional dynamics con￿rms that when en-
vironmental issues are introduced into a Rebelo (1991) type model a unique
stable equilibrium can be reached (that is, BGP is determinate), depending
on the initial values the economy starts up with.
Appendix
A The Social Planner Maximisation Problem










where ￿ and ￿ denote the costate variables associated with the accumu-
lation of physical and natural capital, respectively.











1￿￿ ￿ ￿ = 0 =) c
￿￿E
1￿￿ = ￿ (A.2)
9For example, Benhabib and Perli (1994) study the dynamics of endogenous growth
in a generalised version of Lucas (1988) that incorporates a labour-leisure choice; while
Scholz and Ziemes (1999) try to explain exhaustible resource use by means of a Romer
(1990) type model. They both conclude that equilibrium trajectories are indeterminate,
and a continuum of equilibria is very likely to happen.
10It is usually assumed the presence of cultural and non-economic factors a⁄ecting funda-
mentals like technology or preferences to greenery, as a possible explanation for equilibria









= ￿Ak ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)Akz
￿ = 0 (A.3)
that is simply11
￿ = ￿(1 + ￿)z
￿ (A.4)
2. Equation of motion for each costate variable is given by
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since we assume that, in balanced growth, c and E must grow at the same
rate, g, it is indeed true that
_ ￿
￿
= (1 ￿ 2￿)g (A.9)
11Necessary condition for a maximum can be checked by studying the sign of all principal
minors of the Hessian matrix for the control variables of the problem, whose determinant










thus obtaining, jH1j < 0, jH2j = jHj > 0, that is to say, the system is maximised.
112.c Moreover, the law of motion of the shadow price of the environment, the
costate variable ￿, is
_ ￿ = ￿c
1￿￿E







￿ ￿ + ￿ (A.11)
given that
@U(￿)
@E = c1￿￿E￿￿ = UE. But substituting out ￿ in the RHS,







￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ (A.12)
Since ￿ = Uc, from FOC, and given constancy of z in balanced growth at






(1 + ￿)~ z
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ (A.13)
and ￿nally, since equilibrium requires that
UE
Uc = c
E = ’, it follows
_ ￿
￿
= ￿’(1 + ￿)~ z
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ (A.14)
2.d Equation (A.4) says that
￿ = ￿(1 + ￿)z
￿ (A.15)
but we are assuming that, for balanced growth to be achieved, z must










but since balanced growth requires both output, y, and physical capital,
k, to grow at the same rate, it follows consequently that z must be held
constant at some value called ~ z. Hence, ￿ and ￿ must be equal, so it







12On the other hand, from (A.16), by means of (A.9), follows that
￿t = ￿t = ~ ￿e
(1￿2￿)gt (A.17)
where (1 ￿ 2￿)g < 0, since we assumed that ￿ > 1.
It is easy to note that as long as t ! 1 all Lagrange multipliers converge
to zero (with ~ ￿ being a constant value assumed by both shadow prices in
BGP).
4. Transversality conditions for a free terminal state hold for all shadow
prices, and are given by
lim
t!1￿ke
￿￿t = ~ ￿e
(1￿2￿)gt~ ke
gte
￿￿t = ~ ￿~ ke
￿(2￿g+￿)t = 0 (A.18)
lim
t!1￿Ee
￿￿t = ~ ￿e
(1￿2￿)gt ~ Ee
gte
￿￿t = ~ ￿ ~ Ee
￿(2￿g+￿)t = 0
where ~ ￿, ~ ￿, and ~ k, ~ E, are the shadow prices and the state-values on
the balanced growth path, respectively.
5. Moreover, for free time t, we need to show that lim
t!1H = 0, which is
always veri￿ed due to convergence towards zero of both the discounted
utility function, lim
t!1
U(￿)e￿￿t = 0, and all the multipliers, as proved
above.
B Dynamics of a Rebelo-type model with dirt-
iness
Transitional dynamics of the problem can be derived through the law of
motion of the state variables:
_ k = Akz ￿ c (B.1)
_ E = ￿E ￿ Akz
1+￿














(1 + ￿)~ z
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿
13and being aware that the law of motion for z can be derived from ￿rst order
condition (5), by taking logs to both sides, and then substituting out the law
of motion of each multiplier, as de￿ned in (6).




















































































where ￿ = ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿ > 0.





















evaluated at the steady state (~ x; ~ y; ~ z), thus obtaining,
J
￿







































E = ￿ > 0, and ￿ > 1.
The associated determinant then becomes
DetJ
￿ =



























~ z1+￿ 0 ￿ A~ z
1+￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
(B.7)




















which is always negative (DetJ￿ < 0), as long as all parameters are con-
strained to be positive and, particularly, either ￿ > 1 or ￿ > 1, thus deter-










2. Following Benhabib and Perli (1994), we need to check for the sign
of the real part of the roots (the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix),
and study the stability of the system by means of the Routh-Hurwitz


































(1 ￿ ￿)A~ z
￿
(B.10)
15which is clearly positive (trJ￿ > 0), since ￿ > 1.












































































































always holds. It can be so proved that there are two change of sign in the
characteristic roots, with one negative eigenvalue and two eigenvalues with
positive real part. That is, there is always a continuum of equilibria.
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